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Methods and Models in the Historiography of Occupational Health
The growth of statutory compensation for industrial injuries and illness has attracted
considerable attention from historians of state welfare and students of organized labour in
both Europe and North America.
1 The rights of legal redress for disease and accidents in
the workplace have become the subject of some debate among historians of occupational
health and safety, most particularly in regard to asbestos-related illnesses.
2 Among the
mostdetailed and scholarly accounts of the subject inBritainare those by Peter Bartrip and
his collaborators.
3 In contrast to many accounts in labour and medical history which
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155express strong empathy with the plight of workers who faced injury and death in the
workplace, Bartrip adopts a model of industrial behaviour which is closer to rational-
choice assumptions of mainstream economics.
4 His recent account of government regula-
tion of occupational diseases since the nineteenth century offers limited comment on the
attitudes of trade unionists to accidents, though he broadly maintains that British unions
have historically been more concerned with winning compensation awards than pressing
for the prevention of hazards in the industrial workplace.
5
The role of the Home Office within British government and its handling of the compet-
ing claims of employers, workers and other interested groups has provided the main focus
of debate on occupational health policy in recent years. Critical assessments of the Home
Office include Geoffrey Tweedale and Philip Hansen’s study of the asbestos regulations of
1931, and Sue Bowden and Tweedale’s account of the attitude of civil servants to evidence
of dangerous dust which caused byssinosis in the cotton textiles industry.
6Bartripprovides
a more benign account of government action, arguing that three conditions were required
before regulation could be approved: firstly, evidence of work hazard, secondly, available
technology to ameliorate the hazard, and thirdly, an outcome which was not detrimental to
the economicwelfare ofthe industryand onewhich didnotmerelyreplace onehazard with
other deleterious working conditions.
7 Such debates are concerned with both the influence
which different social actors exercised over the government and the degree to which the
state,andmoreespeciallythee ´litegroupwithinthebureaucracy,respondedtotheevidence
of dangers at the workplace.
There is little doubt that British employers resisted compensation reforms at key periods
andsoughttolimittheirliabilityforaccidentandinjuryclaims,takingacriticalperspective
on information and initiatives demonstrating the hazards of their workplaces. They fre-
quently attributed workers’ illnesses to heredity, domestic or personal lifestyles, and
infections or disabilities caused in the wider physical and social environment rather
4Forexamplesofaccountssympathetictoworkers,
see Charles Levenstein and Gregory F DeLaurier with
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2002; Alan Derickson, Black lung: anatomy of a
public health disaster, Ithaca and London, Cornell
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Mark W Bufton and Joseph Mellingthan the conditions found in industry.
8 Iron and steel firms challenged any suggestion that
their foundries were the source of silicosis in the interwar period, just as coal masters
argued that the hazards from dust underground were confined to the rock-cutting or
‘‘headings’’ work, and were not attributable to ordinary coal-getting operations or
stone-dusting used to contain the risks of gas and firedamp exploding. The research
of different historians also indicates that British civil servants were keen to accommodate
the concerns of business about the impact of reform on the competitive performance of
particular industries.
9 The Home Office responded to the campaigns of pressure groups
and the representations of organized interests by proposing what civil servants perceived
as practical, consensual solutions which could attract the support of trade unions as well as
business leaders. What is also apparent is the determination of the Home Office as well as
British politicians in the interwar years that the state itself should not create or underwrite
funds to compensate the victims of occupational illness or those injured and killed at work.
The mentality of policy-makers and regulators cannot be explained simply in terms of
the rational model of action offered by Bartrip. Their attitudes reflected the established
practices and the institutional structure of the British state in regard to compensation
provision.Fromthetimeofthe1906Workmen’sCompensationAct,andwhenintroducing
national industrial schemes for silicosis sufferers after 1918, successive governments
insisted that the risks and costs of occupational disease should be borne by the commerce
that caused them. This assumed the legal capacity to identify and pursue an employer as
well as a contract to insure present and future risks. Evidence from silicosis discussions
indicates that the Home Office was careful to exclude any suggestion—from employers as
well as unions—that the state would take responsibility for compensation insurance. Legal
challenges as well as political lobbying compelled ministers and civil servants to review
periodically the schemes designed to prevent respiratory diseases. The institutional struc-
ture and the bureaucratic culture of the Home Office in regard to the problem of injury and
compensation, along with the adversarial legal system in which legal cases were deter-
mined, provided the setting within which the different groups sought to influence govern-
ment policy in the early decades of the twentieth century.
The influence of distinct interests on the formation and implementation of industrial
health policy in Britain has formed the first main thread of debate among historians. The
second is concerned with the creation and status of knowledge about hazards at work.
Bartrip offers both a rationalist and commonsense model of policy formation in which
government officials require that the extent of hazard be scientifically verified and solu-
tions are demonstrated to improve the overall safety of the workforce. Other scholars
emphasize the degree to which understanding is shaped by social and political relation-
ships. Allard Dembe has argued that the recognition of occupational disease and disorder
has depended on three conditions: the selection of employees and working methods, the
8Bartrip argues that the extent of institutionalized
conflict between workers and industrialists should
notbeexaggeratednorthebenefitstoworkersandtheir
families be underestimated. He calculates that by the
end of the 1930s, between 5 and 6.5 per cent of the
workforce in applicable industries were making
successful claims for compensation. If dependents of
compensationrecipientsareincluded,thiswouldimply
that more than one million people were beneficiaries.
P Bartrip, ‘The rise and decline of workmen’s
compensation’,inPWeindling(ed.),Thesocialhistory
of occupational health, London, Croom Helm, 1985,
pp. 157–79, on pp. 164–5, 173–4.
9See work by P W J Bartrip and G Tweedale.
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‘‘A Mere Matter of Rock’’inclination of workers to seek medical treatment, and the agreement of physicians that
there is a causal link between a medical condition and the work environment.
10 These
decisions have been made within a specific historicalcontext. As David Rosner and Gerald
Markowitz demonstrated in their pioneering study of silicosis regulation in the United
States, popular and professional awareness of the disease was shaped by social, political
and economic forces as well as technical and scientific ones. In these struggles the
American labour unions played a key role.
11
Historical research on the formation of occupational health policy, including compensa-
tion provision, and the discussions which decided the status of scientific knowledge
regarding workplace hazards have largely concentrated on the activities of e ´lite groups
incontactwith theHomeOffice.Therehasalso beenconsiderable sociologicalresearchon
the subject of workers’ responses to injury risks that emphasizes not only the capacity of
employees to appreciate hazards, forming a ‘‘lay epidemiology’’, but also to decide on a
civic or community strategy for dealing with the shared dangers of occupational illness.
Michael Bloor has recently argued that the introduction of pneumoconiosis regulations in
1943 was the result of more than a decade of ‘‘political lobbying, legal arguments and
epidemiological data gathering’’ by the South Wales Miners’ Federation. The concern of
the Welsh miners with pit safety arose, he suggests, not so much from civic engagement as
from class struggle at work and the remarkably close connection between pit and com-
munity in South Wales.
12 Such a perspective is valuable in refining our understanding of
labour attitudes and registering the interplay between distinctive constituencies and
national organizations in the political struggles over the regulation of workplace hazards.
We would argue that the complex calculations and conflicts over injury at work are not
easily reduced to an overriding narrative of class struggle and community solidarity. The
policypreferences ofabodysuchasthe SouthWales Miners’Federationweretheoutcome
of a range of strategic calculations, timely manoeuvres and political accommodations
inside and outside the union. There can be little doubt that the Federation played a pivotal
role in guiding the claims of individual miners for compensation while pressing for the
extension of the scheme to all underground workers. In promoting their members’ claims,
miners’unions madean important strategic decisionto adopt the methodologyof scientific
proof and to agitate for incremental progress in compensation provision. This strategy did
not inhibit the Federation from presenting a rising number of claims in the early 1930s and
the early 1940s, even when half or more of them were rejected by the Silicosis Medical
Board.
10Allard E Dembe, Occupation and disease: how
social factors affect the conception of work-related
disorders, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1996,
pp. 3–6, 17–19, 229–32.
11David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz, Deadly
dust: silicosis and the politics of occupational disease
in twentieth-century America, Princeton University
Press, 1991, pp. 4, 202–4. See also Gerald Markowitz
and David Rosner, ‘Corporate responsibility for
toxins’, The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, Nov. 2002, 584: 159–74.
Seager has also showed how the political power of
Americanunionsfinallyforcedrecognitionofsilicosis,
D R Seager, ‘Barre, Vermont granite workers and the
struggle against silicosis, 1890–1960’, Labor Hist.,
2001, 42: 61–79.
12Michael Bloor, ‘The South Wales Miners’
Federation, miners’ lung and the instrumental
use of expertise, 1900–1950’, Soc. Stud. Sci.,
2000, 30, 1: 125–40; and idem, ‘No longer dying
for a living: collective responses to injury risks
in South Wales Mining Communities, 1900–47’,
Sociology, 2002, 36, 1: 89–105, particularly
pp. 100–102.
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Mark W Bufton and Joseph MellingWe develop these arguments in the remainder of the article. The origins of the silicosis
compensation schemes, their application to the coal mining industry and the pattern of
claims from that sector are considered first. We then consider in more depth the contribu-
tion of the miners’ unions to the reform process, with particular reference to the South
Wales experience. The third section of the discussion examines the impact of the silicosis
schemes on the pattern of compensation claims made by miners in the 1930s and the role
of the unions in guiding their members through the assessment procedures laid out by
government. Finally, we consider the appointment of a fresh investigation by the Medical
Research Council (MRC) and the transformation of the medical diagnosis of respiratory
diseases in coal miners during the early 1940s.
The Origins of Silicosis Regulation and the Coal Mining Industry
When the first significant legislation was introduced in 1919 to protect industrial work-
ers from the dangers of silicosis, the mining of coal was not a serious target for regulation.
Although the coal industry employed more than a million men before 1914 and was by far
the largest form of mining undertaken in the United Kingdom during the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, there was wide agreement that coal dust represented little direct
threat to the respiratory health of those workingunderground.There had been considerable
interestduringthemid-nineteenthcenturyinrespiratorydiseaseamongcoalworkers.Lung
disease was often identified by physicians as anthracosis or pneumoconiosis, although it
was more commonly termed ‘‘miners phthisis’’ or ‘‘black lung’’ in Britain, the United
States andothercountries.By1914 the lungdisease ofcoal minershad largely disappeared
from the purview of medical science. The reasons for its extinction were unclear even to
those who pronounced its demise.
13 One factor was the rise of silica as the archetypal
‘‘dangerous dust’’, a view which was still a medical orthodoxy in the early 1930s.
14
The immediate concernoflegislatorsandthe Home Office inthe earlytwentiethcentury
was to control exposure to silica in such sectors as the mining of ganister, or fireclay, and
13Numerous authors have commented on this
‘‘collective forgetting’’ of the disease and its
subsequentre-discovery.Posnerwrote,‘‘Afterthis[the
1860s] interest in anthracosis gradually faded out. The
reason for this strange development ...is still a matter
of controversy. The fact is that most leading figures in
Occupational Medicine considered the chapter of the
‘black lung’ closed.’’ E Posner, ‘Milestones in the
history of mineral dust pneumoconioses’, in J Cule
(ed.), Wales and medicine: an historical survey,
London, British Society for the History of
Medicine,1975,p.47.Posnercitednolessanauthority
than Thomas Oliver and his edited collection
Dangerous trades (1902) to support his view. Hunter
cited the views of Edgar Collis in noting that, ‘As the
nineteenth century drew to its close doctors all
over Great Britain had satisfied themselves that
anthracosis of colliers had ...ceased to exist as a
medical problem’, Donald Hunter, The diseases of
occupations, 6th ed., London, Hodder and
Stoughton, 1978, p. 1014. Collis had commented in
1915 that asthma among coal miners had been
prevalentinSouthWalesbutthediseasehadpassedand
that ‘‘conjecture as to its character and causation are
idle’’. E L Collis, Industrial pneumoconioses
with special reference to dust-phthisis, Milroy
Lectures1915,London,HMSO,1915,p.10.Derickson
has described how Collis contributed to the
medical rejection of the distinctive condition of
pneumoconiosis by insisting that the symptoms were
those of silicosis. Derickson, op. cit., note 4 above,
pp. 48–50.
14E H Kettle, ‘The relation of dust to infection’,
Presidential Address to Royal Society of Medicine,
1930, 25, pp. 1–16. ‘‘In different countries the
composition of dust will vary, but all dangerous dusts
have one factor in common: they all contain free silica,
thedioxideofsilicon;andsofar aswe knowthedegree
of harmfulness of a dust depends upon the amount of
free silica present in it.’’ On p. 2.
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‘‘A Mere Matter of Rock’’other forms of ‘‘refractory’’ minerals that contained high levels of silica. This particular
industryemployedafewthousandminers,mainlyinYorkshireandpartsoftheMidlands.
15
The Refractories Industries (Silicosis) Scheme introduced in 1919 was organized on
the basis of compulsory industrial insurance, forming a compensation fund to which
the employers contributed by a levy on the industry. The Scheme was regulated by the
Home Office in consultation with Joint Committees made up of workers as well as
employers’ representatives.
16 In the administration of this pioneer scheme there arose
the familiar complaints from employers that respiratory disease, particularly tuberculosis,
which originated beyond the workplace was presented as occupational silicosis. The
situation was aggravated, they claimed, by the propensity of older workers to move
into the refractories trades as unemployment forced them out of other industries during
the early 1920s.
17 At this stage the Home Office officials, Robert Bannatyne, Edward
Middleton, Thomas Legge and Edwin Field, sought to reassure the employers who com-
plained that ‘‘local authority’’ doctors who lacked specialist expertise were certifying
tubercular workers as silicotic.
18 After the passage of the important workmen’s compensa-
tion legislation of 1923, the refractories employers argued that the government should bear
part of the cost of a medical board rather than throwing the expense completely on the
industry, which the Home Office officials again refused to entertain as ‘‘a departure from
the policy as regards workmen’s compensation generally’’. The civil servants similarly
insisted that the medical board must be independent of the various parties who had an
interest in the compensation award.
19
From the early days of industrial silicosis schemes, employers in the more important
industrieswere anxioustorestrictthescopeofHomeOfficeregulationandtochallenge the
initiatives of medical researchers, who were perceived to be sympathetic to the interests of
organized labour. The most powerful iron and steel firms challenged the extension in 1919
of the Refractories Scheme to iron foundries by an Order of the Home Secretary.
15PRO PIN 12/11, includes details of an
investigationintoganisterminingnearSheffieldbyEL
Collis as Medical Inspector of Factories with marginal
notes dated 25 April 1917 by R R Bannatyne of the
Home Office. The same file has a ‘Report on
Proposed [Refractories] Scheme’ by Dr A J Hall,
Professor of Medicine at Sheffield University,
19 Dec. 1917. Both Thomas Legge and E L Collis
commended Hall’s work. Letters A J Hall to T Legge,
19 Dec. 1917, and E L Collis to Home Office,
18 Jan. 1918. Collis noted that Sheffield’s ganister
mines and metal grinding industry made it a centre of
‘‘industrial fibroid phthisis’’. The coal mining industry
in Yorkshire was also affected.
16PRO PIN 12/14, ‘Memorandum on Refractories
Industries (Silicosis) Scheme’, 4 Feb. 1919, indicates a
levy on wages of 6.25 per cent on persons working
abouta mineorquarrywherematerialworkedcontains
80 per cent or more silica. The limited demands on the
CompensationFundestablishedledtoareductioninthe
levy to 5 per cent from 1 Jan. 1937 and further
reductions were proposed in discussions on 4 April
1947. Government Actuary to Edwin Field at Ministry
of National Insurance, 21 May 1947. See also Arnold
Wilson and Hermann Levy,Workmen’s compensation.
Volume 1: Social and political development,
London and New York, Oxford University Press,
1939, pp. 264–6.
17PRO PIN 12/22, ‘Notes of conference held at the
Home Office 9 November 1922 regarding the
Refractories Industries (Silicosis) Scheme, 1919’.
Comments of Mr Davie for the Refractories
Industries Compensation Fund Ltd.
18Ibid. Bannatyne and his colleagues ruled out the
appointmentofaspecialistMedicalOfficertodiagnose
cases as impracticable and expensive, while also
rejecting the suggestion that the Home Office could
consider appeals against awards.
19PRO PIN 12/22, ‘Notes of Conference with
Refractories Industries Compensation Fund, 2 May
1924’. R R Bannatyne to Job Holland and to H J C
Johnson. To the latter, Bannatyne noted: ‘‘Under our
general compensation law the Certifying Surgeons and
MedicalRefereeswereappointedandcontrolledbythe
Home Office and he [Holland] thought the Medical
Board must be independent of the parties.’’
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Mark W Bufton and Joseph MellingThey argued that the trade unions would quickly demand the extension of any regulation
covering workers involved in the crushing of ganister to all employees, even though ‘‘no
enquiry has ever been made as to whether any risk does in fact exist in the foundries’’.
20
The iron and steel masters clearly saw a direct relationship between the provision of
compensation for silicosis and the continuing bargaining over wages and effort in the
industry, where the presence of a possible risk placed a weapon in the hands of trade
unionists to extract greater rewards as well as interrupt production on safety grounds.
There was a significant step towards the effective maintenance of silicotic workers with
the introduction of the Workmen’s Compensation (Silicosis) Act of 1924, a Medical Board
of two medical officers examining claimants and granting certificates to workers under the
different industrial schemes. The problem of deciding on the levels of risk posed by silica
to the lungs of those working it was vividly revealed in discussions between the Home
Office and employers engaged in the sandstone industry, following the introduction of a
‘‘Various Industries (Silicosis) Scheme’’ in 1928. In negotiations with Bannatyne and his
Home Office colleagues at the end of the year, there was considerable discussion, and
concern was expressed by both employers and unions regarding the proposal to base the
definition of rock covered by the distinctive scheme as sandstone containing 50 per cent or
more free silica. In these discussions it became apparent that the relationship between
geological conditions and the onset of disease could not be precisely measured, Dr Edward
Middleton acknowledging that the Home Office had no clear estimate of the amount of
silica in rock strata which presented a hazard to workers.
21 The exchanges also raised the
threat to the workforce posed by tuberculosis, since the presence of silicosis-tuberculosis
required the immediate suspension of the worker, whereas a diagnosis of ‘‘simple sili-
cosis’’, or silicosis in its early stages, did not. The employers and unions agreed that
employees should be compelled to attend a medical examination within two months of
being hired.
22
The question of the diagnosis of silicosis and the experience of administering the
Refractories Industries Scheme were considered by a Departmental Committee of the
Home Office appointed in early December 1928 and reporting in June 1929. Acknowl-
edging the difficulty of diagnosing silicosis and distinguishing its symptoms from other
chest diseases (including tuberculosis), as well as the impact of coal dust on silicotic lungs,
the Committee expressed itself convinced that ‘‘silicosis is more widespread than is
generally believed, and that it occurs to some extent in a number of industries and
20PRO PIN 12/12, ‘Silicosis Order: Minutes of
Deputation from the Iron & Steel Manufacturers
[to Home Office], July 25 1919’. Opening statement
by J E Baker, Chairman of the Sheffield Engineering
Employers’ Association. The regulations covered
materials and articles which contained 80 per cent
silica. Baker noted that the Order had been based on
a report by Sydney Smith and Dr E L Collis on the
mining of silica and making of silica bricks rather than
foundry work.
21PRO PIN 12/39, ‘Sandstone Industry (Silicosis)
Scheme: Notes of Conference with representatives
of employers and workers, at the Home Office,
December 19 1928’, pp. 11–12, Edward Middleton to
Hudson Brook. Bannatyne later commented: ‘‘I do not
like to exclude anything where there is any risk.’’
Ibid.,p.25.PROPIN12/39,‘Noteoffurtherconference
with employers and workers in regard to definition
of ‘‘sandstone’’’, 20 Dec. 1928.
22PRO PIN 12/39, Ibid., pp. 40–1: R R Bannatyne
toHBrook,andDavietoHilton.Itwasalsoagreedthat
workmen must reveal their previous employment
history, at the risk of being denied compensation,
subject to Joint Committee decision. Ibid., p. 46.
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23 The Committee recommended
the extension of the Medical Board model developed in the refractories and sandstone
industries for fresh schemes in potteries, with the Sheffield Board becoming the central
bureau under a chief Medical Officer for the training of full-time specialists to staff the
Boards. The Committee also suggested closer links with the Tuberculosis Service for the
organization of the radiological and radioscopic examinations that played an essential part
inthediagnosisofsilicosis.
24Thediscussionsofthevariousschemesduringandafter1919
indicate that by the time the coal mining industry was brought under Workmen’s Com-
pensation rules by the Various Industries (Silicosis) Scheme of 1928, a number of con-
tentious issues regarding silica hazards and the examination of workers had already been
aired at the Home Office.
The first permanent Medical Inspector of Mines, Dr S W Fisher, was appointed at the
end of 1927, some three decades after medical experts were appointed to the e ´lite corps
within the Factory Department at the Home Office.
25 Fisher quickly became a significant
figure in discussions about silicosis in coal mines. He assisted the Home Office Committee
which reviewed the arrangements for the diagnosis of silicosis in 1929, became a member
of the Industrial Pulmonary Diseases Committee (IPDC) of the Medical Research Council,
and gave evidence to the Royal Commission on Safety in Coal Mines in 1936. Fisher
commented on the investigations of the IPDC when giving his evidence to the Royal
Commission, though his most telling comments related to the evidence of serious respir-
atory disease in miners who had never worked in silica-rich rock such as hard headings,
particularlyinthe SouthWales coalfield.
26Fisher’saccountreflectedthe confusion among
medical and mining researchers and the absence of any consensus on the nature and causes
of chest diseases among colliers in the anthracite and other coalfields.
27 The bewildering
array of evidence and theories concerning the lung disorders among different groups of
miners provided the impetus for the attempts of various researchers to undertake a fresh
investigation that led to the ovular study by the Medical Research Council, which we
discuss below.
Although the scientific and medical evidence on silicosis and pneumoconiosis did not
provide any clear explanation of the extent of lung diseases among coal miners in the
1930s, there were important changes (particularly in 1931 and 1934) inthe requirements of
the compensation schemes available to miners. These relaxed some of the eligibility
requirements for those wishing to claim compensation and extended the provisions to
allow more miners to submit claims after the Various Industries Scheme first came
into force at the beginning of 1929. The revisions in the scheme were accompanied by
23PRO T161/806, ‘Silicosis (Medical
Arrangements)Committee,ReportoftheDepartmental
Committee appointed by the Secretary of State to
advise as to the medical arrangements which could be
made for the diagnosis of Silicosis’, pp. 7–8.
24Ibid., paras. 7–10, pp. 12–15. The report
concluded with an appeal for further research on the
subject of silicosis.
25‘Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal
Commission on Safety in Coal Mines, Evidence
submitted by Dr S W Fisher, 2 November 1936’,
[hereafter,FisherevidencetoRCSCM]p.843.Copyin
PRO POWE 8/199. Fisher emphasized investigations
of the lungs of rock drillers from the Somerset
coalfield in 1925–31.
26Fisher evidence to RCSCM, Minutes of
Evidence, paras. 22323–22332.
27Mark Bufton and Joseph Melling, ‘Coming
up for air: the role of experts, employers and trade
unions in compensation schemes for silicosis
sufferers in the United Kingdom, c. 1922–1934’,
Soc. Hist. Med., 2005, 18(1): 1–24.
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Mark W Bufton and Joseph Mellingnoticeable increases in the number of compensation applications submitted, accepted
and rejected in the early 1930s. These reforms cannot easily be attributed to any fresh
scientific enquiryor tothe independentinitiatives of civil servants atthe Home Office.The
impetus to early changes in the Various Industries Scheme as it affected the coalmining
industry came, in part at least, from the campaigns of miners’ unions to improve
compensation provision for those suffering from dust-related illnesses. The next part of
the article considers the particular contribution of the South Wales Miners’ Federation to
the compensation debate at this period.
The Miners’ Unions and the Silicosis Compensation ‘‘Crisis’’
The Miners’ Federation of South Wales was an amalgam of district unions and lodges or
branches, which organized colliers across the region, as well as having close contacts with
miners in Somerset. The western area of South Wales around Swansea was the district
where the anthracite coal seams were concentrated. Anthracite was a hard coal with high
calorificvalue,particularlyvaluableforindustrialandtransportuses,thoughitwasinthese
mines that the highest incidence of lung diseases among coal miners were recorded. The
Federation first became actively involved in the question of compensation for silicosis
sufferers in 1926–27, when W H Mainwaring from South Wales raised the matter at the
Miners’ Federation of Great Britain (MFGB) 1927 conference.
28 In 1926, the year of the
General Strike, it was reported to the South Wales Federation that the MFGB had met with
theConservativeHomeSecretarytodiscusstheinclusionofsilicosisasascheduleddisease
for the purposes of the Workmen’s Compensation legislation.
29
There was limited success with the inclusion of coal mining in the 1928 Various
Industries provisions, though the evidence we have from other areas of Wales is that
very few cases of silicosis were recorded for compensation purposes before 1928.
30 A
keyprovisionofthe1928Schemewasthatanyclaimantforcompensationhadtoprovethat
he was working in rock that contained at least 50 per cent free silica and had been working
in the industry for a considerable number of years. By 1930 the Federation had established
its own Silicosis Committee, pressing for amendments to the Silicosis Order made by the
Home Office. The Federation also demanded that the 50 per cent rule be dropped from the
VariousIndustriesregulationsfortheindustry.
31Wecantraceacontrastbetweentheviews
expressed by the members of the Trades Union Congress General Council, and even the
MFGB, and those recorded by the Federation at this period. After the introduction of new
regulations for workers engaged in trades affected by silicosis and asbestosis in 1931, the
28MFGB, Annual Conference, 25 July 1927,
Proceedings, p. 73. Mainwaring stated that the South
Walesdistrictwasnotseverelyaffectedbysilicosisbut
might soon be because of the nature of the work
undertaken in coalmining.
29SWMF, Minutes of Council Meetings, Annual
and Special Conferences 1926, Council Meeting,
Miners’ Office, Cardiff, 6 Feb. 1926.
30Joseph Melling, ‘The risks of working
and the risks of not working: trade unions,
employers and responses to the risk of occupational
illness in British industry, c. 1890–1940s’,
London, ESRC Centre for the Analysis of Risk
and Regulation at the London School of
Economics and Political Science, Discussion
Paper no. 12, includes figures from North Wales
Mutual.
31SWMF, Minutes 1930, Silicosis Committee,
6 Feb. 1930; SWMF, Minutes, Cardiff, 27–28
June 1930.
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‘‘A Mere Matter of Rock’’TUC expressed a debt of gratitude to the Labour Home Secretary who secured the passage
of the new measure, which they considered a ‘‘godsend’’. The MFGB conference of 1931
also heard the TUC commending the reduction in silica levels from the 80 per cent
specified in an original 1918 scheme to the 50 per cent required under the 1928 provisions,
while acknowledging that this remained unfair to many workers.
32
The MFGB had pressed their own arguments on the Home Office, stating that the 50 per
cent rule rendered the scheme ‘‘almost worthless to coalminers’’ and that almost all
operations within the coal mine should be eligible for compensation if a worker was
found to be suffering from silicosis. At this point, the Home Office was drafting amend-
ments to the 1928 Various Industries Scheme, removing the requirement on the employee
to demonstrate that he had worked in rock which contained at least 50 per cent free silica.
TheMFGBalsourgedthattheprovisionthatamineworkershouldhavebeenemployedfor
at least three years before becoming eligible for compensation should be removed, and
those miners who were already suffering from the disease should be given compensation.
Faced with vigorous opposition from the Mining Association of Great Britain, the Home
Office firmly rejected these proposals. The MFGB Silicosis Sub-Committee complained
that the schemes were still ‘‘enumerating processes’’ rather than scheduling the coal
miningindustryasasingle process, thoughthe MFGBdecided thatitwouldbe‘‘dangerous
to insist further on [its] own amendments’’.
33 The MFGB had been concerned that the
Medical Board appointed under the Scheme could still take into account the length of time
a worker had been employed in the industry before awarding compensation, though they
agreed to accept the revisions.
34
The improvements secured in 1930–31 did not impress the deputation from the Federa-
tion, including Mainwaring and Evan Williams, who travelled to the Home Office in 1932
to discuss the administration of the Various Industries Scheme. The Welsh Federation
representatives clearly felt that the leadership of the British Miners’ Federation, led by A J
Cook, had displayed a limited understanding of silicosis and the compensation problems
faced by the miners in areas such as South Wales.
35 One difficulty with the 1929 Scheme
was the ruling that no silicotic miner could be considered eligible for compensation unless
he had worked in areas where the free silica content of rock was at least 50 per cent. The
Federationcomplainedatthe British Federation conferencethatthey employedchemists at
a rate of £30 per analysis to demonstrate that the rock had sufficient silica to comply.
Representatives of the Somerset miners (who were exposed to high levels of silica) also
complained that they found it difficult to secure medical support for a compensation
application, even when high levels of silica were undoubtedly present. Geologists as
well as chemists were consulted as miners and their unions sought expert testimony in
support of silicosis claims.
36
32MFGB, Annual Conference, 1931, pp. 83–6.
33MFGB,ReportoftheExecutiveCommittee,June
1931, pp. 157–60. The MFGB saw the main advantage
of the 1930 Various Industries (Silicosis) Amendment
Scheme lay in the removal of the obligation on the
miner to prove the composition of the siliceous rock.
34MFGB, Minutes of the Executive Committee,
12 Feb., 1931, pp. 2–4, for concerns of the
Sub-Committee.
35SWMF, Minutes Council Meeting, Miners’
Office,Cardiff,10June1932,pp.54–6.Thedeputation
comprised Oliver Harris, W H Mainwaring, and Evan
Williams.
36MFGB, Annual Conference, 11 July 1932,
pp. 111–16.
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Mark W Bufton and Joseph MellingHaving accumulated the opinion of geologists as well as the details of seventy miners
unable to secure compensation, the MFGB had a meeting with the Home Office in 1933 to
discuss the ‘‘public scandal’’ of compensation in the coal mining industry. The MFGB
deputation included D F Davies of the Anthracite Miners Association in South Wales, who
argued that geological investigation clearly indicated that miners could contract silicosis
without working in rock that possessed a high composition of silica. The Home Office
insisted that its own medical experts considered that all hazardous occupations in coal
mining were covered by the 1931 provisions. Rather than geological evidence, Bannatyne
and his colleagues in Whitehall emphasized that individual medical histories of men who
had contracted silicosis without compensation were critical to pressing the case for the
modification of existing schemes. As well as the medical diagnosis of silicosis, the indus-
trial biography of an individual miner’s career became a vital feature of the compensation
debate. In this context, the MFGB dispatched details of fifty-nine cases of miners certified
by the Medical Board assilicoticwho were refused compensation incourt because the men
could not prove they had worked on scheduled rocks. The Federation insisted that such
cases demonstrated the urgent need for the Home Secretary to issue an Order extending
compensation rights to all underground workers.
37
There were also complaints of delays in issuing new regulations for silicosis sufferers
who were not compensated.
38 Among the most prominent critics of the 1931 Scheme and
advocates of radical reform had been unionists from Somerset and South Wales. James
Griffiths of Somerset told the MFGB’s conference in summer 1934 that the need to prove
the silica content of the rock in which they worked, particularly where employers hired
geologists to argue that the sediments contained little or no hazardous silica, forced the
unions into expensive legal battles to prove that the rock was indeed sandstone. The unions
were concerned with prevention as well as compensation, with early diagnosis enabling
theirmembersto‘‘getoutofthepitandsoprotecttheirhealthandlives’’.
39Griffithsshared
the radical view held in South Wales that any miner diagnosed by the Medical Board as a
silicosis sufferer should be compensated without further ado, since the disease was far too
serious for its compensation to depend on ‘‘a mere matter of rock’’. In support of this
argument he cited the controversy over the cases of twenty-three men at the Tirbach
Colliery in Ystalyfera. These miners had been diagnosed in 1932–33 as suffering from
silicosis but only two had secured compensation awards, scientific witnesses for the
colliery having argued that employment in Tirbach was not responsible for the men’s
condition. At the Federation meeting of the British mining unions, Griffiths denounced
the ‘‘scandal’’ where the employers’ Mining Association was able to devote its con-
siderable resources to ‘‘buying brains and experts in order to confuse counsel and the
government’’.
40 Faced with such expert testimony in the court room, the MFGB decided to
employ the geologist A Herbert Cox to prepare a detailed report in support of the cases
37MFGB,MinutesofExecutiveCommittee,26–27
Oct., 1933, pp. 14–16, and 23 Nov. 1933, p. 3.
In this account of the meeting at the Home Office,
the official Fudge acknowledged that medical experts
differed on how the disease was contracted and that
itwasessentialthataman’sworkingcareerwasknown.
38MFGB, Minutes of Executive Committee
Meeting, 17 May 1934, p. 4.
39MFGB, Annual Conference, 16–18 July 1934,
Tuesday’s Proceedings, p. 36.
40Ibid., MFGB, Annual Conference, 16–18 July
1934, Tuesday’s Proceedings, pp. 36–7.
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‘‘A Mere Matter of Rock’’preparedbytheSouthWalesunion.Coxfoundthat‘‘shales’’containedthesilicamineralin
‘‘combined form’’ and argued that the exact percentage of silica which could damage the
lungs of miners working in dry and dusty conditions was unknown. After dispatching
Cox’s report to the Home Office, the Federation journeyed to London to discuss the
question further, whereupon the civil servants again stressed the value of individual
cases and employment records of miners who were suffering from serious lung disease
without being certified as silicotic.
41 In these and other ways the activities of the South
Wales Federation contributed directly to the debate on the reform of the Various Industries
Scheme in 1934.
British miners’ leaders could reasonably argue at the end of 1934 that the amendment of
the Various Industries Scheme was the fruit of the ‘‘enormous amount of money expended
and great effort exercised by the Federation in prosecuting claims, and making representa-
tions to the government for improved legislation’’.
42 The 1934 Scheme extended the
compensation provisions to all underground workers, though the new provisions applied
only to workers employed after 22 October 1934 without any scope for retrospective
awards. The reform did not resolve the contentious question of silica content in rock.
Bannatyne assured the unions that the Home Secretary believed the provisions now
covered any colliery worker employed underground, though the interpretation of the
rules was clearly a matter for judges rather than politicians.
43
The battle duly moved to the courts in 1935–36, with the Welsh Federation again
assuming a prominent role in the struggle with mine owners and insurers, and declaring
that the issue had ‘‘developed into a form of intense struggle between ourselves and the
Employers’’. This struggle was most apparent in legal cases such as those involving the
claim of the Tirbach miners which involved the employment of geologists as well as
solicitors and medical specialists.
44 Although the 1934 scheme held out the prospect of
compensation toallunderground coal miners whowere certifiedassilicotic,the employers
challenged the decision in the important case of Wragg v. Fox, arguing before the High
Court that the 1934 Amendments were ultra vires.
45 As a consequence, the progress of
individual compensation claims was blocked until the matter was resolved.
46 After the
Court of Appeal ruled in favour of the employers in 1935, the Federation determined to
‘‘fight the issue to the end’’. In practical terms this meant a shift back to lobbying the
Home Office in favour of another Order to fulfil the declared intentions of the 1934
41MFGB, Annual Conference, 16–18 July 1934,
pp. 37–8.
42SWMF, Minutes of Council Meetings, Annual
and Special Conferences 1935, Report of Executive
Council, 1934–1935, Cardiff, pp. 19, 24–5.
43MFGB, Minutes of Executive Committee
Meeting, 22 Nov. 1934, pp. 1–2.
44SWMF, Minutes of Council Meetings, Annual
and Special Conferences 1936, Report of Executive
Council, 1935–1936, Cardiff, pp. 35–7.
45The legal point at issue according to the union
was whether paragraph 2 of the Various Industries
(Silicosis) Scheme 1931, applied to the new Various
Industries (Silicosis) Scheme of 1934. The original
paragraph read: ‘‘Provided that the employer shall not
be liable under this paragraph in any case where he
proves to the satisfaction of the County Court judge or
other arbitrator that the workman has not, during the
employment to which the disease is alleged to be due,
been exposed to the dust of silica rock’’. Also
Butterworths’ Workmen’s Compensation Cases, 1935,
28 (new series): 447–68.
46SWCC: MNA/NUM/3/5/box G.17 1937,
Compensation Correspondence Area No. 6, letter
to Oliver Harris, General Secretary, SWMF,
area no. 6, from Terence Wall, 21 May 1937.
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Mark W Bufton and Joseph Mellingamendments.
47 The matter was ultimately decided in the House of Lords as the MFGB
finally claimed victory in the Wragg case during 1937.
48
The activities of the miners’ organizations clearly influenced the progressive revision of
different silicosis schemes introduced from 1928, though union activity was largely
devoted to fighting individual cases of silicotic miners rather than engaging in a general-
ized public campaign in favour of comprehensive legislation. The lobbying of civil ser-
vants as well as parliamentarians was a significant feature of union activities during the
1930s, though it would be misleading to exaggerate the importance of these London
meetings.Thecampaignformoreliberalsilicosisprovisionsismoreaccuratelyunderstood
as a cumulative movement which extended from the court cases pursued by miners and
their supporters in a range of districts, including even areas of west Scotland, which were
little known for vigorous unionism during the early twentieth century.
49 These district
unions and even the national Federation of miners in Britainfacedconsiderable difficulties
in seeking to deploy expert testimony to balance that of the eminent consultants whom the
employers’ legal advisers could secure.
50 The experience of the Wragg and other legal
contests persuaded the miners’ leaders of the importance of achieving a clear diagnosis
even after the rules for compensation were extended in the 1934 revisions.
The next section briefly considers the impact of these compensation schemes on the
pattern of claims that represented the attempts of diseased or deceased miners and their
dependents to secure financial support from the owners.
The Compensation Claims of Miners in the 1930s
The impact of revisions in government regulations on the attitudes of miners towards
compensation for industrial disease is difficult to ascertain with any precision. We have
reliable information only on the claims actually made. The figures which survive for
silicosis and pneumoconiosis claims indicate a rising trend from 1931 (Figure 1). The
number of applications and certificates granted for the South Wales coalfield appear to
have risen steadily in the 1930s and again, but more sharply, in the early 1940s.
There are various ways in which the rising trend in applications and certificates granted
in South Wales may be explained. Sir Andrew Bryan, a former Chief Inspector of Mines
and Quarries, suggested that increased mechanization and the drive to higher output
produced a heavier concentration of dust, contributing to a worsening of respiratory
47SWMF, Minutes of Council Meetings, Annual
and Special Conferences 1937, Report of Executive
Council, 1936–1937, Cardiff, pp. 40–1.
48Butterworths’ Workmen’s Compensation Cases,
1937, 30 (new series): 51–63. SWMF, Minutes of
Council Meetings, Annual and Special Conferences
1938, Annual Report of Executive Council, 1937–
1938, Cardiff, pp. 41–2. MFGB, Minutes of Executive
Committee Meeting, 24 Mar., 1937, p. 76. The
phrase about legal victory in Wragg v. Fox belonged
to Ebby Edwards, Secretary of the MFGB.
49University of Glasgow Archives, UGD 162,
Ayrshire Mutual Insurance Association: Minutes,
1 Sept. 1933, 1 June 1935, for individual cases.
In late 1934 the Ayrshire Association
discussed the work of the Silicosis Committee in
London and the Home Secretary’s decision
to include all underground workers in the Various
Industries (Silicosis) Scheme, without agreeing
to the insertion of an order ‘‘that it would
only apply to men who were employed on &
after the date of the order’’. Minutes,
11 Dec. 1934, concerning meeting of
17 Oct. 1934.
50MFGB, Minutes of Executive Committee
Meeting, 16 Aug., 1934, pp. 2–5.
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‘‘A Mere Matter of Rock’’disorders and rising claims. Such arguments have to be treated with some scepticism since
in the South Wales mines there was limited progress of mechanical cutting. Both geology
and the traditional working methods of the region provided obstacles which were sig-
nificant enough to inhibit even the progressive Powell Duffryn company from fully
mechanizing their coal faces. Only 7 per cent of South Wales coal was mechanically
cut in 1927 and by 1939, it had risen to only 16 per cent. Even after the drive for maximum
output during the war years, machines were cutting less than a third of the area’s coal in
1944. Historians of the industry agree that the most important form of mechanization seen
in South Wales lay in the rapid introduction of machine conveyors, the proportion of coal
being carried mechanically rising from just over a quarter in 1928 to almost half by 1939.
The evidence suggests that the face cutters were not the main force behind the rise in
compensation claims even if they undoubtedly led to an increase in underground dust
where they were deployed.
51
There may be greater reason to accept Bryan’s claim that there was a drive for increased
output, or at least that employers were able to increase miners’ workloads by taking
advantage of depressed economic conditions and high unemployment to shift the ‘‘effort
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Figure 1: Silicosis and pneumoconiosis compensation awards to South Wales miners.
Note: The above figures do not include the Forest of Dean area for the years 1937–1939. The figures
probablyunderstatetheincidencefor1944sincetherewasaconsiderableaccumulationofcaseswhere
miners were awaiting examination, only to be considered in 1945.
Source: SWCC: MNC/PP/35/1 ‘National Union of Mineworkers (South Wales Area Council) Reports on the
incidence of the diseases silicosis and pneumoconiosis, and the preventative measures adopted to combat the
diseases in South Wales’, 22 August 1945.
51The friable nature of the South Wales coal
restricted the use of machines for under-cutting seams.
Barry Supple, The history of the British coal
industry: vol. 4: 1913–1946: the political economy of
decline, New York, Clarendon Press, 1987, pp. 31,
316–17, 384; David Greasley, ‘The diffusion of
machine cutting in the British coal industry, 1902–38’,
Explorations in Economic History, 1982, 19: 246–68,
on pp. 247, 253; idem, ‘Fifty years of coal-mining
productivity: the record of the British coal industry
before 1939’, J. Econ. Hist., 1990, 50: 877–902, on
p.883;TBoyns,‘Jiggingandshaking:technicalchoice
in the South Wales Coal industry between the wars’,
Welsh Hist. Rev., 1994, 17: 230–51.
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Mark W Bufton and Joseph Mellingbargain’’ in favour of colliery firms.
52 The efforts by coal owners to use their over-men to
drive output in these years could have provoked miners, including elderly underground
workers, to present themselves for examination and pursue compensation in a bid to leave
the industry and secure some form of maintenance. In the absence of detailed information
on the age and output of the workforce, wage incentives and working practices, it is
virtually impossible to address this question. The general figures which we do possess
onproductionandemploymentinthe SouthWales coalfield(indicatedinFigure2)suggest
that both were declining in almost equal proportions after 1924, which does notnecessarily
suggest a shift in individual output or a decisive move of the effort bargain in favour of the
coal masters.
Further clues to the pattern of illness and compensation applications may be found in the
growing number of claims that were refused in the late 1930s. The available data for 1939–
1943 reveals a marked rise in refusals (Table 1).
53
52The effort bargain is the relationship between
work effort and reward (pay), more effort for less
reward means a shift in power and control to the
employers and less work for the same or more reward
means a shift in power and control to the workers. The
locusclassicuson thisis William Baldamus,Efficiency
and effort: an analysis of industrial administration,
London, Tavistock, 1961; for the larger context of
workplace supervision and the effort bargain, see
Joseph Melling, ‘Safety, supervision and the pursuit of
productivity in the British coal mining industry,
1900–1960’, in J Melling and A McKinlay (eds),
Management, labour and industrial politics in modern
Europe: the quest for productivity growth during
the twentieth century, Cheltenham, Elgar, 1996,
pp. 145–73.
53It would appear that since 1931 refusals for
certificateshadstoodconsistentlyaround50percentof
all claims. PRO FD1/2898, Letter to Dr Faulkner,
MRC, from Ministry of Fuel and Power, 16 Jan. 1947.
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‘‘A Mere Matter of Rock’’There has been little systematic investigation of the increase in claims. Philip D’Arcy
Hart, who was closely involved in research on pneumoconiosis in the 1940s, has suggested
that the 1934 Scheme secured compensation on the granting of a certificate by the Medical
Boardandthatthisledtoadramaticriseinthenumberofclaims.Refusalsalsoincreasedas
X-ray and post-mortem examinations failed to discover the classical or ‘‘ordinary’’ symp-
toms of silicosis. The result was growing discontent on the South Wales coalfield.
54
D’ArcyHartprovidesaplausibleexplanation,butcloseranalysisoftheevidencereveals
variations both in applications and in the proportion of certificates which were refused,
long after the 1934 changes in eligibility rules. Further clues are suggested in David
Michaels’ argument that a liberalization of injury benefits may cause an ‘‘instant pre-
valence bias’’, as employees are given greater incentive to report illnesses or discomforts
that were previously tolerated.
55 In this context it is worth recalling, however, that the
relaxation of the qualifying rules did not relate directly to medical symptoms, but rather to
tenure in the industry and to the known existence of silica-rich rock in the proximity of the
claimant’s workplace. The rising number of applications has to be understood, in part at
least, in terms of the procedures for examination and the patient-physician relationship
which Dembe and others have emphasized. There is some evidence that medical practi-
tioners in South Wales were more inclined to diagnose patients with chest illness as
potentiallysilicotic,ascomparedwithphysiciansinotherdistrictsassociatedwithsilicosis.
Oneunion official complainedtoanMFGB conferencein1934 thatSomersetdoctorswere
diagnosingsilicosisasbronchitisandthatonlywhenthesepatientcaseswereconsideredby
specialists at the Medical Board were they identified as silicotics.
56 One factor in the
54P D’Arcy Hart, ‘Chronic pulmonary disease in
South Wales coal mines: an eye-witness account
of the MRC Surveys (1937–1942)’, Soc. Hist. Med.,
1998, 11: 459–68, on p. 462.
55Dembe, op. cit., note 10 above, p. 92. Dorman
similarly notes, ‘‘when benefits rise and claims follow
suit, it may well be that fewer legitimate claims are
being suppressed’’. Peter Dorman, Markets and
mortality:economics,dangerouswork,andthevalueof
human life, Cambridge University Press, 1996,
pp. 198–9. It is remains methodologically difficult to
estimate whether there is any ‘‘demonstration effect’’,
implicit in the reduced suppression hypothesis, from
available figures.
56MFGB, Annual Conference, 16–18 July 1934,
Tuesday’s Proceedings, p. 36.
Table 1
Number of coal miners’ patient cases certified and rejected by the Medical Board (Silicosis)
in the South Wales Coalfield, 1939–1943
Year 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943
Certificates issued (partial or total disablement) 387 428 474 735 985*
Certificates refused 271 394 662 957 963*
Total 658 822 1136 1692 1948
Certificates refused (percentage of total) 41 48 58 56.5 49
*Of these 399 certificates were issued and 264 certificates refused under the new scheme, which
came into operation on the 1 July 1943.
Sources: PRO POWE 8/266, ‘Ministry of Fuel and Power, report of the Advisory Committee on the Treatment
and Rehabilitation of Miners suffering from Pneumokoniosis’, draft, p. 6.
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Mark W Bufton and Joseph Mellingwillingness of Welsh doctors to offer a diagnosis of silicosis was the frustration felt by
many physicians at the controversy and uncertainty which had arisen over the aetiology of
silicosis.
57 Another was the concern that the issue of compensation or ‘‘pensionability’’ of
miners only compounded these difficulties by requiring a degree of certainty which
medical science could not provide. As Dr Matthews of Neath commented with some
exasperation:
We do not know exactly how much whisky is required to produce cirrhosis of the liver ...Health
and disease are relative conditions. But the standards imposed upon the diagnosis of pensionable
dust disease almost preclude the diagnosis being made at all by the doctors most concerned.
If a person is severely ill or dying with a disease commonly believed to be caused by dust, rarely,
if ever, seen under conditions not associated with dust, and presenting the typical clinical
features ...medical diagnosis should not be hampered by the question of its pensionability, and,
whether the conditions be silicosis, anthracosis, silico-anthracosis or tubercle silico-anthracosis,
provision should be made for them.
58
The propensityofsuch doctors toprovide aninitial diagnosis ofsilicosiswas also undoubt-
edly influenced by the readiness of the Federation and its lodges to use the services of
physicians who were known to be sympathetic to the predicament of miners with chest
problems.
The Federation appointed its own compensation secretary and the officials of the local
lodges appear to have played a vital role in advancing many, possibly most, silicosis
injury claims. When Jacob H of Abergorky Lodge died in 1938, for example, the
Federation’s Area Secretary contacted Alderman Rhys Evans for assistance in presenting
a compensation application to the Medical Silicosis Board in view of the owners’ request
for a post-mortem.
59 In other instances individual miners appear to have used the
prospect of compensation (including where symptoms of miners’ nystagmus as well
as respiratory problems were evident) to bargain with the company about the offer of
employment rather than pressing an injury claim, frequently compromising any subse-
quent claim for compensation via the union. In July 1936 United National Collieries
wrote to the Federation’s Porth secretary regarding the claims of two injured miners,
stating that on the closure of Abergorky Colliery their mine manager had met the men
concerned and they had ‘‘definitely said that if they could get work they would not
bother about compensation. He provided them with work on this condition.’’
60 The
evidence is scanty and fragmentary, although it appears that the Federation perceived
their role as the protector of dependents as well as injured miners, advising family
57Bufton and Melling, op. cit., note 27 above,
provides a discussion.
58National Library of Scotland, J S Haldane
Papers, 10306, Box of unlisted materials:
Dr Matthews, ‘Silicosis and other dust diseases:
Neath Area’. Also in this collection is a paper
by Dr Williams of Swansea, ‘Pneumonoconiosis
in coal hewers’, which shows 11 of 39 coal hewers
with chest symptoms (chiefly anthracite workers)
showed infective silicosis from x-ray films, 21 being
non-infective.
59SWCC: MNA/NUM/L/3/18, Abergorky Lodge
Compensation Cases and correspondence: case of
Jacob H deceased. Tal Thomas to Rhys Evans, 14 Dec.
1938, 30 Dec. 1938, 10 Jan. 1939.
60Ibid.,caseofGPJ,regardingnystagmus,23May
1933, and letter of W J Thomas to David Lewis,
7 July 1936. Further correspondence 28 July–31 Aug.
1936suggestedthatTJohnhadbeenpaidcompensation
while G P J was ‘‘in regular employment’’. The latter
possibly referred to regular employment disqualifying
G J P for partial disability payment.
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‘‘A Mere Matter of Rock’’members on negotiations with insurance firms as well as preparing an application for
compensation.
61
The limited correspondence and documentation which survives for individual claims
in these years provides us with some understanding of the choices available to miners
who displayed some symptoms of silicosis. Individuals were capable of conducting their
own negotiations in regard to employment, presumably calculating the costs and benefits
of an application where the likeliest outcome was either a decision by the Medical Board
that silicosis was not present or the removal of the applicant from arduous underground
labour to light or moderately heavy work. In the decision to apply for compensa-
tion under the schemes of 1931–34, the miners’ relationship with their physicians
figured, as well as the crusade of the miners’ unions to promote the rights of members
and dependents. The unions appear to have been principally concerned to remove or
reduce the responsibility on the miner to demonstrate a specific period of employment
and proximity to hard silica-laden rock. They argued that the relevant condition was the
lung disease suffered by the mineworker. The negotiations of the British and Welsh
Miners’ Federations with the Home Office yielded significant results in that the officials
were compelled to accept that there were many patient cases of serious lung disease
which could not easily and directly be attributed to working with hard sandstone. After
1934 the emphasis shifted from the geological or chemical analysis of the rock to debates
over the causes and progressive nature of respiratory illness in the mining communities,
including the evidence of lung disease where significant silica deposits could not be
traced.
After a long period of apparent stalemate in the exchanges between geologists, mining
engineers and medical scientists, the Medical Research Council was faced with a rising
numberofclaims where coalminersinthe anthraciteandotherareaswereclearlysuffering
from acute lung disease even where they had little contact with sandstone. In 1936–37 the
MRC agreed to undertake a major new investigation into the incidence of lung diseases
among coal miners in South Wales. The reports of this research team, appearing in 1942,
1943 and a final report in 1945, provided a historic reappraisal of respiratory diseases
among coal miners and other colliery workers.
62 The final part of the article considers the
origins and early progress of this study.
The MRC Study and the South Wales Miners
The decision to undertake a fresh investigation of the coal miners’ lung problems was
the result of a series of campaigns and initiatives, including the efforts of mining
engineers and of the coal owners themselves to embark on a scientific assessment
of conditions underground. The growing uncertainties around the nature of ‘‘silicosis’’
61Correspondence attached to individualcase from
Area No.1, case of L Owen of Banwen Colliery,
whodied23Apr.1944andwaslatercertifiedashaving
died from pneumoconiosis, as per certificate
12June1944.Hiswidowedmother,ElizaPwasguided
on compensation claim. Davies, Secretary of SWMF
to Eliza P, 6 June 1944.
62Population Based Research in South
Wales: The MRC Pneumoconiosis Research
Unit and the MRC Epidemiology Unit,
Wellcome Witnesses to Twentieth Century
Medicine, vol. 13, London, Wellcome Trust, 2002,
pp. 3–5.
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Mark W Bufton and Joseph Mellingin coal miners also troubled the senior officials at the Home Office. In 1936 one of the
senior Home Office officials visited the Mines Department to discuss the growing
support for the view that symptoms of lung disease among miners were not always
attributable to the presence of silica. Bannatyne, a veteran of industrial compensation
and occupational injury cases, became alarmed that the publicity given to the cases in
South Wales would create a ‘‘public sentiment’’ for new legislation with the prospect of
lung diseases being included in the schedule of the Workmen’s Compensation legisla-
tion without scientific (i.e. forensic) evidence of their cause.
63 His colleague Edwin
Field also expressed concern that the MRC investigation was about to be undertaken in
an atmosphere of intense political pressure because ‘‘this was not the way in which
good work was done’’.
64 Whereas Field was sceptical about the rationale for the fresh
research, pointing out that this was political and administrative rather than scientific and
objective, S W Fisher, his counterpart at the Mines Department, was much more
sanguine that the causes of these non-silicotic lung diseases would be uncovered by
the MRC study.
65
The political pressure to which these civil servants referred would have included the
activities of James Griffiths, elected President of the Federation in 1934 and returned to
Parliament for Llanelli with a massive majority in 1936. Griffiths pressed both the Home
Secretary and Ramsay MacDonald to investigate the problems that miners with silicosis
faced in winning compensation, forcing the Home Office to acknowledge the limits of
medical knowledge and to ensure that fresh research was undertaken by the MRC.
66 These
preliminary investigations involved visits to South Wales and interviews with working
miners during 1936, though the researchers found many colliers were reluctant to submit
themselves to medical examination, even though their union urged the men to agree to
requests from the MRCteam.
67 The anxieties of the miners provided eloquent testimony to
their concern about the possible loss of employment if they were declared to have weak
lungs.
68
AnothersourceofpressureonboththegovernmentandtheMedicalResearchCouncilin
thelate1930swere thepresscampaignsonthehealth problemsoftheWelshminers,which
clearly irritated the Home Office. These included a News Chronicle series by Louise
Morgan on the accidents and diseases faced by colliers in ‘‘five fatal valleys’’.
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65PRO FD1/2884, memo, 19.xi.36.
66James Griffiths, Pages from memory, London,
J M Dent, 1969, p. 55. House of Commons, Hansard,
7 May 1936, cols., 1853–1854, Apr., 21 to May 8,
1935–36,3111.Regardingthedangersofworkingwith
white lead, Bartrip has similarly noted that a few
letters and some parliamentary questions from
backbench MPs can be transformed into evidence of a
major hazard. See Bartrip, op. cit., note 5 above, p. 85.
67SWMF, Minutes of Council Meetings, Annual
and Special Conferences 1937, Report of Executive
Council, 1936–1937, Cardiff, pp. 42–3, 46–7. The
Federation lodges in South West Wales decided to
support the investigation.
68The fear of loss of employment also deterred
workers in the slate industry from claiming
compensation for tuberculosis and/or silicosis,
see L Bryder, ‘Tuberculosis, silicosis, and the
slate industry in North Wales 1927–1939’, in
Weindling (ed.), op. cit., note 8 above, pp. 108–26,
on p. 120.
69The five valleys were Swansea, Neath, Dulais,
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‘‘A Mere Matter of Rock’’passed on the large correspondence and donations, which she received in response to these
articles, to Evan Williams at the Federation, seeking his guidance on ‘‘how far she could
go’’ in depicting the attitudes of South Wales miners.
70 Williams believed that this press
campaignwas popularwith ‘‘his people’’and had an excellent effect, particularly when the
News Chronicle published two accounts by Williams himself, in which he took the
opportunity to denounce the coal owners for their callous and indifferent response to
concerns about silicosis.
71 In presenting themselves at the early investigations by the
Medical Research Council, the officials of the Federation were keen to emphasize that
they vetted compensation claims before they were submitted to the Silicosis Medical
Board. Arthur Horner, President of the South Wales Miners’ Federation, told the MRC
team that sick miners were mostly from the anthracite district of the western area and had
been sent for X-ray by the Federation and Regional Medical Officer. Only when they
received a positive diagnosis from the Federation’s doctor and a certificate from the
Medical Officer were they presented to the Board. Horner claimed that Federation doctors
were bemused at the failure of 30 per cent of the claims before the Medical Board, which
argued that the disease might not be strictly due to silicosis.
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The investigators at the Medical Research Council were well aware of the institutional
and political climate in which they were considering the new study. Their preliminary
report in 1936 noted that there were two distinct demands being made of their investiga-
tion: firstly, that it should provide an understanding of the health problems faced by miners
in South Wales; and secondly, that it shouldclarify the legal and administrative grounds on
which compensation could be awarded. The Council was clearly concerned that what they
perceived as a scientific enquiry into the medical and health problems of miners would be
obscured,orovertaken,bythepoliticalconcerntoresolvetheurgentissueofcompensation
payments for diseased miners.
73 These anxieties appeared to be confirmed when the
Industrial Pulmonary Diseases Committee of the MRC received further preliminary
reports and arranged to proceed with a major investigation at the beginning of 1938.
The Manchester Guardian was only one of a number of newspapers to greet the news
in highly optimistic terms as the beginning of a new drive to eradicate silicosis.
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The press campaign and the responses of the Medical Research Council also exposed
significant divisions among some of the senior figures at the Council. After a flurry of
headlines announcing the imminent reduction in the prevalence of silicosis in the coal-
fields,SirEdwardMellanby,SecretaryoftheMRC,issuedastiffrebuttalthatappearedina
numberofpopularandbroadsheetnewspapers,aswellasintheLancetandBritishMedical
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MNA/NUM/3/5/20.Anexampleofthecorrespondence
and donations can be found in letter to Evan
Williams, 26 Feb. 1936, from Mrs B., Corydon, and in
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June 1936, both in SWCC: MNA/NUM/3/5/20. Real
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archive disclosure rules.
71LettertoMissMorgan,NewsChronicle,London,
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Department of the Federation), 22 Feb. 1936, SWCC:
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andmedicalresearchers,Williamsidentifiedthe‘black
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72PRO FD1/2884, ‘Medical Research Council:
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held on 17 June 1936.
73PRO FD1/2884, ‘Medical Research Council:
Committee on Industrial Pulmonary Disease’, meeting
held on 17 June 1936, p. 2.
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75 It is worth quoting this disclaimer, which noted that:
During the past week several newspapers have published inaccurate accounts of the progress of the
investigation into silicosis in the South Wales coalfield which is being promoted by the [MRC] ...
These include a statement attributed to ‘‘a member of the pulmonary Diseases Board’’ (apparently
meaning one of the investigators working under the direction of the Committee), to the effect that
the results of the inquiry will make possible an immediate reduction of over eighty per cent in the
incidence of silicosis in the anthracite coalfield; the facts are that the investigation is still in an early
stage; that the results cannot yet be assessed; and that no such opinion as that purporting to be
quoted has been formed. No interview has been given to the press, and the alleged statement has not
been made by the investigators.
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Mellanbywasconcernedthatthenewspapercoveragewouldinvitepopularexpectationsof
a rapid decrease in silicosis across South Wales.
There may have also been something of a personal struggle between Mellanby
and D’Arcy Hart, who was equally appalled that the Daily Mail, as one of the ‘‘chief
perpetrators’’ of these claims, had identified the MRC investigators by name.
77 Hart was
also annoyed by Mellanby’s public refutation of the account since the MRC Secretary had
advised a Daily Herald reporter to consult him personally for details of the enquiry. Hart
complainedtoaseniorcolleagueattheMRCthathehadnotbeenconsultedabouttheletter
and requested a meeting with Mellanby on ‘‘the whole matter of publicity’’, since Hart
believedthathe shouldbe the main contact with the press on questionsrelatingto the MRC
study.
78 These exchanges indicate that the pursuit of scientific evidence and its presenta-
tion to the public was coloured by the micro-politics of the MRC and the promotion of
personal reputation as well as the protection of scientific rigour in the face of intense
political and press speculation at the outcome of the investigation. These professional
rivalries, and the personal investment in scientific reputation which they reveal, formed
one part of, and were also informed by, a wider set of struggles over the uses to be made of
evidence in the protection and compensation of miners during the period reviewed in this
article.
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Conclusions
Much of the historical debate over the regulation of respiratory disease in British
industry has been concerned with the ways in which the Home Office and its
75‘Silicosis inquiry in South Wales: a disclaimer’,
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editor,7Feb.1938;‘SilicosisinquiryinSouthWales:a
disclaimer’, Br. med. J., 5 Feb. 1938; ‘Our readers
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authoritative statement of the position: results cannot
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Post, 8 Feb. 1938.
77PRO FD1/2886, Letter to Dr Lansborough
Thomson from P D’Arcy Hart, 2 Feb. 1938.
78PRO FD1/2886, Letter to Dr Lansborough
Thomson from P D’Arcy Hart, 8 Feb. 1938.
Hart commented: ‘‘I feel I must, if I am
to have the responsibility of seeing pressmen,
have authority to make as well as to refuse
statements’’
79For professional rivalries in a different
medical sphere, see Mark W Bufton, David F Smith
and Virginia Berridge, ‘Professional ambitions,
political inclinations, and protein problems:
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Committee 1947–1950’, Med. Hist., Oct. 2003,
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‘‘A Mere Matter of Rock’’senior medical experts responded to evidence of hazardous conditions in the workplace.
Discussions of occupational illness in the interwar years have been dominated by three
kinds ofnarrative.Firstly, acritical assessment oftheHome Officeasinclined tosafeguard
the interests of industry and protect its competitive position in difficult trading conditions
rather than seize the initiative in promoting health and safety at work where evidence was
inconclusive. Secondly, a more benign view of the Home Office and its advisers as honest
brokers who sought to balance the competing claims of different interest groups and to
meet the legitimate claims of organized labour wherever possible, even though the latter
were often more concerned with compensation rewards than preventive regulation.
Thirdly, an account of occupational health which views the hazards facing workers as
only one aspect of a wider class oppression and struggle in which there remained hard
choices of idleness and unemployment even when compensation was provided.
Itispossibletofindsomesupportforeachoftheseinterpretationsinthesourceswehave
used for our analysis of silicosis schemes in this period. In particular, the major associa-
tions that represented organized labour claimed important victories in their dealings with
politicians and civil servants in these years.
80 We have argued, however, that the rival
interpretations of the Home Office’s relationship with organizedinterests and its responses
to evidence of industrial hazard do not provide us with a compelling explanation of the
complex array of calculations and pressures which resulted in silicosis regulation and
ultimately a fresh investigation by the MRC. In particular, we question the interpretation
provided by Bartrip that the Home Office responded effectively when scientific evidence
of a hazard was demonstrated, together with practical techniques for its eradication.
Our analysis has suggested that the personnel of the Home Office were eminently
reasonable and conscientious in seeking to discover consensual solutions to the complex
problem of respiratory health. Their professional and ethical conduct was framed, how-
ever, within both intellectual and institutional boundaries which ensured that the pervasive
dust hazards faced by the largest workforce affected were largely occluded from serious
consideration until the closing years of our period. By 1918 the fundamental problem of
respiratory health in the workplace was perceived as largely one of silica poisoning, where
dust was inhaled in concentrated amounts over a lengthy period of time. Hazardous
sandstone dust was associated with a relatively narrow range of mining, cutting, grinding
andclay-bakingoperationsthatposed asevere threattoa fewthousand workers.Atleastas
important as the preoccupation with the distinctive hazard of silica rock to the industrial
workforce, were the institutional arrangements for legal compensation underpinned by
scientific orthodoxy. The small refractories industry remained the model for regulation
across a range of industries, though it was soon apparent that the requirement in the 1928
Various Industries Scheme for the miner to demonstrate a substantial period of recent
employment in working rock with high silica content did not permit compensation of
numerous miners with severe lung disease.
80MFGB, Annual Conference July 1935, pp. 43,
175, for example. The SWMF heard that while
‘‘Governments move slowly in these matters’’ the
1934 Silicosis Scheme was the fruit of
‘‘many years of effort’’ and signalled a radical
change of view from 1928 when it had been
thought that silicosis ‘‘could not be contracted in
a coal mine’’.
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Mark W Bufton and Joseph MellingHaving carefully built an intricate system of preventive, surveillance and compensation
arrangements in consultation with employers, workers and others, the Home Office
appeared reluctant to contemplate a radical shift in the paradigm of regulation. Relaxations
of the rules in 1931 and particularly in 1934 were secured only after considerable pressure
and the investment of union funds in lengthy legal conflicts. Even the appointment and
conduct of the MRC study in 1936–38 was overshadowed by the controversy over the
refusal of compensation to diseased coal miners. For British governments and their admin-
istrative personnel were anxious to avoid their provisions for industrial injury being drawn
on to the complex, contested terrain of labour contracts and into the battles over minimum
hours and wages which had culminated in the bitter and prolonged coal dispute of 1926.
They were well aware that iron and steel employers, as well as the coal masters, were
determined to prevent the inclusion of such areas as foundry work in the silicosis schemes.
It was the determined campaigning by the Miners’ Federations across Britain and in South
Wales which challenged British governments not only to reconsider the predicament of
collieryworkersbutalsotoreappraisethescientificrulesofthecompensationgame,for,as
Bloor has noted, the mining unions did not ‘‘passively receive and assimilate scientific
information’’.
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In emphasizing the macro politics of Britishgovernment as a necessary context inwhich
to understand the regulation of occupational disease, we have also attempted to encompass
the micro world of individual claims and the patient-physician relationship which Dembe
and others have explored. For, if the value of class analysis lies in the capacity to relate
workplace struggles to the collective politics of Welsh mining communities, its limitations
can be detected in the tendency to equate the interests of miners with the more radical class
agenda of particular leaders. We have suggested that individuals sometimes sought to
negotiate their own solution to the problem of bad lungs, while in many other cases the
local union lodges were involved in pressing applications. It seems likely that sympathetic
doctors were diagnosing some cases of silicosis on a speculative basis, suggesting the
possibility of silicosis in miners with respiratory disorders. In examining the fragmentary
documents which survive for particular applications we recognize that these sources
contributed to the particular patient histories which were framed according to the require-
ments of the different schemes. The individual’s account of his industrial history had been
recognized as an essential feature of accurate diagnosis in occupational health for many
years. During the interwar years the predicament of the individual miner became part of
a larger political and intellectual struggle over the responsibility for ill health in the
workplace.
These conflicts were not engendered simply by a sense of class injustice. The Federation
and other unions were also riven by political sectarianism and occasional leadership-
member conflicts over slow progress in tackling silicosis. It was the threat of disaffection
among the South Wales miners that contributed to the dramatic decision in 1943 to
subordinate silicosis to pneumoconiosis as the most important hazard facing British
81Bloor, ‘The South Wales Miners’ Federation’,
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‘‘A Mere Matter of Rock’’miners.
82 In 1946 the Inspector of Mines, Brian Spencer, claimed that dust suppression
methods had effectively tackled the hazard of coal dust and that the ‘‘Scourge of the Welsh
[had] been vanquished’’.
83 Though Spencer’s article did draw attention to the prominence
of the Welsh collieries in the transformation of government policy during the previous two
decades, his assessment seriously underestimated the chronic disease of pneumoconiosis
which continued to disable those affected in the post-war period.
82The three Medical Research Council Reports
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inhalation. Medical Research Council, Chronic
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